We study the effects of German unification on domestic macroeconorruc vanables, taking as given the wage and exchange rate parity legislated at the time of the union. We argue that a unification with these features is similar to a mass migration of low-skilled agents holding no capitai in a foreing country. vVe show that, absent a welfare state, this event has substantial redistri buti ve effects in favor of capitai holders over the business cycle and depressive long run consequences. With a welfare state attempting to keep the distribution of incarne constant over the business cycle, depressive long run effects may be amplified as capital owners are forced to pay the resulting increase in welfare outlays. We argue that this is exactly what happened since the fall of the Berlin wall and the resulting recession could have been predicted. Finally, we examine two policies modifying the current status quo. a wage freeze for migrants and a wage subsidy for enterprenuers, and show that they may contrast negative long run tendencies.
l INTRODUCTION

Introduction
The fall of the Berlin wall and the successive reunification occmred in July 1990 were phenomenal macroeconomic shocks to the German economy which lead to major adjustment problems. Several key factors may have contributed to make the adjustment more problematic. First, the lmification was associateci with the decision to impose a oneto-one exchange rate between the two marks and a wage parity between the East and the West. This may certainiy have contributed to the substantiai Ioss of competitiveness experienced by East German firms and to the collapse the industriai sector, which curtailed the national product of the East and led to high Ievels of lmempioyment rates. Second, the Ioss of protectionists measures, in piace in the East even in the late 1980's, may aiso have contributed to the collapse of the industriai sector therefore reinforcing the previousiy described effects. Third, the fiscai expansion, which followed the collapse of the industriai sector in the East, has Iead to higher taxes in West, to a Iarger budget deficit and to restrictive monetary poiicy in order to keep interest rates high enough to allow the government to piace the debt needed to finance the reconstruction of the East. Severa! anaiysts (see e.g. The Economist (1996) ) beiieve that this combined set of events was su:fficient to induce a recession in the West which compounded the negative effects on empioyment and output coming from the East.
In this paper we take the wage parity, the one-to-one exchange rate and the increase in fiscai expenditure as given and ask what would have been the Iikeiy consequences of these measures once unification was achieved. We do this in a model of a singie country with two types of agents, simiiar to the one empioyed by Canova and Ravn (1996) . The two types of agents are modelled as high-skilled and Iow-skilled agents: high-skilled are more productive and own the capitai stock whiie Iow-skilled are unabie to insme their conslmlption streams.
We argue that unification under these conditions represents a formidabie shock to the West German economy, quaiitativeiy similar to a mass migration of reiativeiy unskilled agents, holding no capitai to a foreign nation. We show that such a mass migration has substantial business cycle consequences and negative Iong-run macroeconomic effects. Since the popuiation growth rate temporariiy increases, the capitai-Iabor ratio decreases and the economy will devote resources to reblùid the per-capita capitai stock. This will be the only observabie effect if agents in the economy are homogeneous. However, with a heterogeneous work force, there is aiso a second effect, caused by a permanent change in the composition of the popuiation, which generates more substantiai short-run dynamics and permanent long-run effects. In particuiar, if the newcomers have Iower productivities than the average native worker, output, capitai, hours worked in efficiency units and
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2 highly-skilled hours will be perrnanently lower in the new steady-state.
Under these conditions, an infiow of low-skilled labor also has short nm distributional effects on natives. Low-skilled workers are negatively affected: because they earn lower wages and are restricted frorn participating in financial rnarkets their incorne declines. In contrast, high-skilled workers, who own the capitai stock, are better off because the return to capitai increases.
To this setup we adda Government whose only task is to redistribute incorne in such a way either to keep the relative incorne scale of agents constant over the business cycle or to insure low-skilled agents frorn any kind of incorne fluctuations. We find that when such a policies are in piace, the burden of the adjustrnent falls in part or totally on high-skilled/ capi tal owners which have to finance a larger welfare state, both because the incorne of low-skilled agents drop and because there is a larger fraction of thern. Snch a redistributive schemes rnay be very disruptive as they alter investment opportlmities over the business cycle, induce a recession, lead to a very long adjustment period and worse long-run conditions.
We argue that current policies atternpting to support the incarne of East Gerrnans have exactly the characteristics of an egalitarian or insurance type rule and are therefore bound to produce perverse effects both over the adjustrnent process and in the long nm. Essentially, these policies eliminate the incentivate for entrepreneurs to rnake investments so that both capitai and incarne per-capita will drop proportionally in the long run. Moreover, welfare provisions of exactly the form t ha t we consider ha ve been rnentioned in the literature as the rnain difference between the East Gerrnan transition process and the transitions in other forrnerly centrally planned economies (see e.g. Schrettl, 1992) .
We examine the consequences of adopting two policies recently advocated in the poplÙar press and in policy circles, to rnodify the status quo: a reduction of welfare benefits for East Germans and a tax break for capitai owners. We find that both proposals have merits in contrasting the negative effects induced by the redistribution policies since they decrease labor costs over the business cycle and incentive investrnents in the long nm.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 discusses the recent dynamic of macrovariables in Gerrnany; section 3 outlines our model; section 4 analyzes the quantitative effects of unification under wage and currency parity; section 5 repeats the analysis under two different assumptions on the welfare systern; section 6 discusses the implications of our results for the recent German experience; section 7 examines two alternative policies designed to reduce labor costs. Section 8 concludes.
Recent Macroeconomic Trends of the German Economy
We begin by providing some facts about the German economy in recent years and the changes that have occurred since the fall of the Berlin wall.
3
Figures 1-5 display data for West Germany up to the second quarter of 1990 and for the unified ( "Pan") Germany from the first quarter of 1991. The data is from the National Governrnent section of the OECD except for poptùation numbers which are from the IFS database.
Figure l plots the evolution of the poptùation and workforce of Germany before and after unification. The workforce of West Germany grew steadily through the period with an annual growth rate of approximately 0.5 percent while poptùation grew faster in the fifties and sixties but then levelled out. With tmification poptùation and the workforce increased by about 26%. On impact, unification generateci an ìncrease in real GDP of approximately 14 percent (from the second quarter of 1990 to the first quarter of 1991) but a drop in real GDP per-capita of arounci 10 percent (see figures 2 anci 3). West Germany was thirci in the worlci ranking ofper-capita GDP in 1989 (after Switzerland and Japan) while in 1996 unified Germany ciroppeci to tenth place in the world ranking ( even after Austria anci Belgium). This is a change in macroeconomic activity much larger than what one normally sees over the business cycle. Furthermore, the average annual growth rate of the new unified Germany (l%) is considerably lower t han w ha t W est Germany achieved ciuring the 1960-1990 period (2.75%).
Interestingly, this drop in per-capita GDP is not reflected in the level of fixed investments (see figure 4) . Per-capita real fixed investments of unifieci Germany is roughly the same as the one of W est Germany before unification: at reunification the investment share in GDP of "Pan" Germany increased to its highest level since the boom of the 1979/1980 and then to a levellast achieveci in 1974. Thus with the tmification a boom in aggregate investments occurred in conjunction with a contraction in aggregate output per capita. Figure 5 plots employment level, ciefined as the number of wage anci salary earnc1 anci the unemployment rate, defined as registereci unemployeci to the workforce 1 for the last 36 years. At unification, the percentage increase in employment is larger than the associateci increases in either poptùation or the workforce 2 but this tendency was quickly reversed anci employment constantly ciecreaseci in the perioci 1991-1996. Associateci w: this decline is the surge in the tmemployment rate ( though there are very recent signs of a reversal of this trenci). Unemployment in West Germany was very low prior to 1974, but rose ciramatically after that anci after the recession of the early 1980's. Immeciiately before unification, West German unemployment was trenciing ciownwarci but reunification prociuced a very strong upwarci trend very ciifferent from what was historically experienced, with unemployment reaching an unprececienteci 7 percent of the workforce. Hence, reunification generateci an increase in total activity, a ciecrease in output per-capita, an increase in the investment share anci an increase in hours followeci by a ciecline.
At regionallevel ciifferences between the east anci the west have substantially cieepeneci 1 The workforce is defined as the population between 15 and 64 years of age. 2 Because employment figures excludes self-employed, these differences are exaggerated since a large portion of West German population was self-employed prior to unification while the number of selfemployed in East Germany before and immediately after unification is small.
RECENT MACROECONOMIC TRENDS OF THE GERMAN ECONOMY
4 after unification. In 1995 the per-capita GDP in the East (excluding Berlin) was 50% of that of the West while the West accounted for approximately 90% of the GDP and 98% of the exports of the "unified" Germany. Notice that the GDP of the East dropped by about 35% in the first two years after lmification (from 15% to 8% of the total). Also, the average growth rate in the East, after annual rates of about 7-8% for the 1992-94 period, collapsed to a 1.8% in 1996 and no changes are forecasted in the years to come. Furthermore, while the lmemployment rate in the West has increased from 5% in 1992 to more than 7.0% in 1996, in the East landers it has oscillated armmd 16% after an initial jump from O% to about 25% in 1991. This implies that while during the last years of the Berlin Wall, nine million workers were employed in the East, now only 65% of these have jobs. Finally, on the average over the last five years, job creation as percentage of labor force has been only 2.8% in the East. This small increase was due to the high average wage costs: in 1996 they were about 35% higher than in the West with public services and construction being the only sectors with costs comparable to the West (with differentials being 2% and 12%, respectively). Note also that 50% of the workers in the East have been retrained since unification to adapt them to the western style of management.
The deepening of the wedge between the east and the west is typically attributed to two exogenous facts: the currency union, with a one-to-one exchange rate between the two marks and the rapid rise of Eastern wages towards Western levels. Wage increases have not been supported by corresponding productivity increases with a loss of competitiveness for the industriai sector and of jobs. For example, in the first year of lmification, industriai production in the East dropped to about one-third of the pre-unification level. In comparison, US industriai production fell by 35% during the Great Depression and in other East European cmmtries the decrease was on average 25%.
In 1995, East Germany produced only 60% of what it consmned thanks to the generous and comprehensive "welfare net" that has protected the East since unification. For example, during the first year of unemployment benefits are between 63 and 68% of terminai wages and between 53 and 58% in the second year. After two years, lmemployment benefits are substituted by welfare payments at the same level obtained after one year of unemployment, with some restrictions applying if the spouse if working. One reason typically cited for such massive transfer program has been that without such financial support East Germans would have started a mass migration toward the western part of the country creating politica! and organizational problems. The result has been that West Germans pay higher taxes (for example, West Germans pay a 7.5% solidarity income and corporation surchange to help to finance the East), accept higher interest rates, experienced larger than usual budget deficits (slightly above 3% of GDP on average over the 1991-1996 period while in West Germany before unification budget deficit was only 1.5%), and a loss of competitiveness in international markets.
Public transfers to the Eastern landers have reached approximately 200 billion marks per year in the last 6 years, an amount which corresponds to 4-5% of the annual West German GDP (about 35% of the local GDP every year), approximately DM 7500 per-
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5 capita or twice the disposable income of Poland. Of these transfers social insurance relateci payments accOlmts for about 45% while investment subsidies accOlmts for 12%. Akerlof et al (1991) have estimateci that without subsidies, given the wages hikes of 1990, only 8.2% of the industriai workers COlÙd have retaineci their jobs if production had continueci with the old technologies.
In the 1990-1995 period the German government concentrateci investment efferts on improving the infrastructure in the East but this has come together with the complete disappearance of the export sector (due to the breakdown of the COMECOM trading area) an d of the manufacturing sector (because of high wage costs). As a consequence of subsidies, transfers and infrastructural investments, the size of the public sector has roughly doubled in the last 6 years.
Given this evidence, the questions we are interested in asking are: can we rationalize the economie changes occurred after the fall of the Berlin wall in a dynamic model of the business cycle? Could we have predicted the consequences that the induced wage parity had o n the German economy after the unification? What are the effects of the huge tax-transfer subsidies that the government pays to maintain an egalitarian distribution of income between the two parts of Germany? Should we expect 1mified Germany to go back to the previous star1dard of living (relative to the trend), once the negative effects of unification are exhausted, or stay at a permanently Iower levei? Given the exchange rate and the wage poiicy adopted, are there poiicies that could alleviate the negative tendencies that unification had on macroeconornic variabies?
The Basic Model
The model we use is highly stylized but contains most of the key features needed to understand the recent developments in the German economy we are interested in. First of all, we model German 1mification as a mass-rnigration of agents from one country to another. We assume that arriving rnigrants acquire the political, legai and work rights of Iocal residents. This seems a reasonable working hypothesis since German unification has occurred according to artide 23 of the West German Constitution which gave the former GDR (German Democratic Republic) or part of it, the right to join the FRG (Federai Republic of Germany) with an equal partner status, provided it accepted the conditions set by the FRG. In practice, the poiitical, Iegal and social security system of the FRG was applied with minor changes to the former GDR.
Secondly, we assume that the sending country disappears once migrants move and, as a consequence, that its capitai stock instantaneously depreciates. In other words, we assume that rnigrants do not bring any productive capitai with them. Since it has been estimateci that between 50% and 70% of the capitai stock in piace in the former GDR was obsolete or unusable for production methods in competitive markets (see Siebert (1990) and Sinn and Sinn (1992, p. 44) ) and that the productivity of East German capitai at 3 THE BASIC MODEL 6 the time of unification was between 16% and 40% of that of West German capitai (see Akerlof, et. al. (1991) and Sinn and Sinn (1992) ) this assumption is not so extreme as it may appear.
Third, we assume that the receiving economy possesses two types of agents that differ in their productivity Ievels as in Kydiand (1984 Kydiand ( , 1995 and Rios-Rull (1993) ). We treat unification as an infiow of Iow-skilled workers into the economy. At the time of unification, East German workers had a levei of human capitai (measured either in terms of years of education or education level of employed) which was about 40% higher than that of West German workers. Nevertheiess, we think it is appropriate to treat East German workforce as low-skilled since it had to be extensively retrained to assimilate their skills to western style of production (see Akerlof at al. (1991) ).
Fourth, we assume that Iow-skilled agents are unable to save for future occurrences. The fact that low-income househoids are restricted from accessing financiai markets is well documented in the literature. For exampie, Campbell and Mankiw (1989) and Mankiw and Zeides (1991) have estimated that approximately 50% of US households are liquidity constrained. Given the skill features of newcomers, we shouid expect them to be liquidity constrained as well. However, we go a step further and assume that low-skilled agents (both lo c al an d newcomers) are unable to intertemporally smooth consumption. Although this assumption may look too strong, it is the case that East Germans are currently unable to purchase private insurance contracts which wouid allow them to smooth their consumption stream over the period of interest and gives a scope to the insurance activities of the Government. In any case, this simplifying assumption only affects the composition of the Iabor suppiy over the adjustment path but it does not infiuence the qualitative implications of the model.
Finally, and as a first approximation, we ignore the international repercussions of the unification and assume that the economy of the receiving country is, for ali purposes, closed. This prevents us from considering questions related to external borrowing to finance the construction of the capi tal stock (a fact which appears to be of some importance for the case of Germany since it went from being the country with the largest trade surplus in 1990 to having a current account deficit since 1992). However, this assumption does not change the qualitative implications of our exercise and provides an upper bound to the costs that may have actually been horn by a resident of unified Germany.
It is instructive to present the economy first and then discuss unification later. We denote the two groups of agents by i = s, u w h ere s denotes high-skilled an d u low-skilled.
There are Nf agents of type i at time t and /t is the time t share of skilled agents.
We assume that there is a Iarge number of identical competitive firms renting factors of production from the households. Production takes piace using labor in efficiency units (He) and capitai (K) and we assume that the prodnction function is Cobb-Douglas with constant returns to scale to these two factors. Hours in efficiency units is modelled as a CES-aggregate of the two types of labor with an elasticity of substitution of 1/ p. Skilled hours are more productive than unskilled hours and we let w 2:: l denote productivity 
where lower case letters denote per-capita variables defined as :
It follows immediately from the assumptions of competition that all factors are paid by their marginai products and the relative wage of skilled and lmskilled agents is:
which depends positively on the productivity difference and on the share of nnskilled agents (sin ce we assume that p ~ O). The two groups of agents face different intertemporal utility maximization problems because we assume that low-skilled workers own no capitai and are prevented from purchasing insurance contracts. The problem faced by these agents is:
t=O subject to a sequence of budget constraints: (4) and time constraints:
where eu denotes consumption, zu is leisure, hu is hours worked, Tu is the net income tax (including transfers), {3 is the subjective discount factor and where we have normalized the time endowment to one each period. If we let the ntility function be of the CRRA type, U(ey,lr
-eur-a-u -1), the solution to the problem is:
Thus these agents work a constant number of hours and they simply consume their aftertax incarne period-by-period. The problem faced by high-skilled agents is:
subject to a sequence of budget constraints:
( 7) time constraints:
and the capitai accumuiation equation:
where Xt denotes investments, T 8 the tax rate on skilled agents, and 8 is the depreciation rate 3 . If we assume that the utiiity function is of CRRA type, the intertemporai and intratemporai optimaiity conditions are :
where À is the multipiier on the budget co~straint (7) and es is the share parameter that enters as the power of consumption in the utility function. The first of these conditions sets the marginai rate of substitution between consumption of goods and leisure equal to the relative price of these two goods; the second sets the intertemporai marginai rate of substitution equai to the relative price of consumption between period t and period t + l.
We assume that there is a government whose only aim is to redistribute income across classes of agents via taxes and transfers and it is forced to do this by baiancing its budget on a period-by-period basis. As we argue later, excluding intertemporai borrowing does not affect the essence of out exercise. We assume that Ttu = rt -f-Lt, so that f-Lt is a tax rebate on Iow-skilled workers and that rt is endogenously chosen to target certain redistributive policies, whiie f-Lt is endogenousiy determined to satisfy the government budget constraint: (lO) 3 (7) and (9) includes the population growth rates and the share of skilled agents because these agents own all the capitai stock. Define k~ as the capitai holding of a representative skilled household at time t. We then have that ktNt_ 1 = Nt../f.t· Then use that kt = Kt/Nt-1 and that ìt+lht = gt+ 1 /gf+ 1 where gt+ 1 is the growth rate of the skilled population. In particular, i t follows t ha t: kt = kt/ ìt-1.
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where Yt and yf are the incomes of the two types of agents. The right hand side of (10) is the real tax revenue received from taxation of skilled agents while the left hand side is the net transfer to lmskilled agents.
In the aggregate the following incarne composition and resource constraints must hold:
Finally, we assume that Zt is first-order autoregressive process,
where '1/J E (0, l) and Et rv N(O, cr;).
The Business Cycle Properties of the Model
Before analyzing the effects of unification, it is instructive first to look at the cyclical properties of the economy after we calibrate the parameters of the model. For future discussion, we present steady state relationships in Appendix A. We calibrate the model to match annual data and try to use standard parameter values whenever it is possible. The depreciation rate is set equal to 10% and the real interest rate to 4%. The parameter a (the labor share of incarne) is set to 64% (as in Akerlof at al., 1991). We also assume that the population is stationary in the steady-state. For moderate values of the incarne tax parameters these values imply a capital-output ratio dose to 2.5 which seems to represent sufficiently well the conditions in West Germany before unification. We set the intertemporal rate of substitution to 0.5, and assume that e is equal to 0.3. This implies that low skilled workers use 30% of their non-sleeping time on market activities. All these values are similar to those used by Canova and Marrinan (1996) for West Germany in calibrating a three country model of the business cycle.
For the productivity differential w Kydland (1984) and Rios-Rull (1993) suggest a value of 2, which seems a reasonable upper bound for the average productivity differences between East and West Germany at the time of unification (see Sinn and Sinn (1992) ). We assume that the share of low skilled agents is 50% which is roughly the percentage of West German workers with a secondary education degree or less. Finally, we need to calibrate the elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled workers, 1/ p. We do not know too much about this parameter so we experiment with two cases: p= O, so that the two types of labor, apart from the productivity difference, are perfect substitutes and p= 2/3, implying a more moderate substitutability of the two types of labor.
We have discussed elsewhere in details, the dynamics of this type of model, following a productivity disturbance (see Canova and Ravn (1996) ). Here we only briefly summarize the results of this exercise to give a flavor of the properties of the model.
lO
The aggregate dynamics are very similar to those obtained from a standard model of this type. Investment increases on impact by approximately 3% above its steady state value (following a l% temporary increase in productivity) aiong with output, total hours and totai consumption. aiso increase but with considerabiy smaller eiasticities. Furthermore, since agents are risk averse, the consumption path is smoother than that of other variabies. The capitai stock aiso increases and peaks with a Iag of 6-7 years. The aggregate marginai product of Iabor (in efficiency units) increases on impact by aimost exactiy the size of the disturbance whiie the reai interest rate initially increases and then declines beiow the steady-state. Ali variabies smoothly converge to their steady-state 8-10 years after the shock.
At disaggregateci Ievei it is the high-skilled workers which provide the additionai hours necessary to take advantage of the improved technoiogicai conditions (since Iabor suppiy of Iow-skilled is fixed) and smooth over time the benefits of the disturbance by varying the Ievei of investments. Low-skilled workers benefit from the improved technoiogicai conditions because their wages increase over the adjustment path. Since there are oniy 1% of high skilled agents in the popuiation, the increase in their hours worked exceeds the increase in per-capita hours of the economy. On impact the income of high-skilled agents increases more than that of Iow-skilled agents because of they are more productive and own the capitai stock. Aiso the consumption path of high-skilled agents is smoother than the one of Iow skilled agents as we have forced these agents consume their income on a period-by-period basis.
The Dynamic Effects of the Unification
Next, we describe the effects of a unification with the features we have described. We begin by considering the case where there is no government and, therefore, we set all taxes and redistributive parameters to zero. This step is useful in order to understand how unification wouid have affected the properties of the West German macrovariabies in isolation from issues of arising from redistribution.
Demographics
We model unification as an exogenous temporary increase in the growth rate of unskilled workers, N;:. While i t is straightforward to endogenize migrations as a f1mction of business cycle conditions, we do not look at this possibility here since the fall of the wall and the successive re1mification were unrelated to the state of the West German cycle.
The temporary increase in number of unskilled workers has two demographic effects. First, the aggregate population growth rate rises directly. This effect alone produces short nm dynamics since the long-run capital-output ratio is determined by the parameters of technology and preferences and none of the other steady-state conditions are affected.
Second, there is a permanent effect on the composition of the population which alters long nm conditions. These changes occur because the productivity differences across agents are exogenous. While this would have been an untenable assumption for long nm analysis, it is defendable for business cycle considerations.
The demographic effects can be worked out in the following way. Assume that the population growth rate of high-skilled workers, g%, is constant over time and equal to g and that the population growth rate of the low-skilled workers is : (14) where et is possibly an autocorrelated process. Define the following recnrsive variable:
It then follows that:
The growth rate of population gf+ 1 is stationary as long as et is a stationary process, while there is a permanent effect on the composition of the population regardless of the properties of et. This implies that migration flows create short term adjustments and long run effects when there are skill differences between migrants aJ' the average native worker.
Long-run effects
Before describing short run dynamics it is useful to consider the long-run effects. Table l summarizes the long-run effects of a change in the share of skilled agents. As mentioned, an inflow of low-skilled workers permanently decreases the share of skilled workers in the population. This change does not affect the steady-state capital-output ratio (see appendix A), but it changes the steady-state per-capita output level because of the effect it has on the per-capita hours in efficiency units,
In appendix B we show that, as long as w > l when p = O, per-capita hours in efficiency units is increasing in T Hence, steady-state capitai and output per-capita decrease, highskilled agents work fewer hours, invest less but have higher income and consumption because capitai income is higher, while low-skilled workers are unaffected because wages are determined solely by the capital-ontput ratio which is 1maffected. Thus, nnification leads to a long-run decrease in aggregate per-capita activity and to a higher welfare for the capitai owners. The latter result is familiar from static analyses of migration: the locals which gain are those that differ most from the newcomers, see e.g. Benhabib (1996) . Our 12 results differ from standard ones because we allow capitai accumulation. Here unskilled agents, who are identica! to the migrants, are unaffected in the long-run, while they wmùd experience lower welfare if the capitai stock was kept fixed over the business cycle. The magnitudes of the aggregate effects are relatively large. Assmning that the beforeunification share of skilled agents was 50 percent, then if ali former East German workers are to be classified as unskilled, the share of skilled workers would decrease to approximately 40 percent. If this change in the skill composition persists, then our model predicts a drop in output-per-capita of 6.67 percent (relative to the previous steady state). This drop in activity corresponds to the decrease in effective hours and is associateci with an increase in skilled consumption of approximately l percent. If the change in the skill composition is smaller than this, for exampie, if unified Germany had 45 percent of skilled workers rather than 40 percent, these changes shouid be haived.
It has been estimateci (see Sinn and Sinn (1992) ) that it wouid take a over trillion DM of private investment to reconstruct the capitai stock per-worker in the East at 1989 West German Ievel. Assuming that 1989 Ievei was the pre-migration steady state, this impiies that over 100 billion DM a year for ten years are need for East Germany to catch up, with mean share of investment to GDP between 80 and 130% (in West Germany in 1990 the mean share was, depending on the calcuiation, between 13 and 26%).
The outcome of this though experiment in our modei depends on the definition of Iabor. In terms of Iabor unadjusted for the productivity of the workers, the required change in the capitai stock needed to keep the capitai Iabor ratio unchanged is approximateiy 50 percent of the initiai GDP before unification. Thus, if this was to be financed within East Germany and achieved within 10 years, it wmùd necessitate to an investment share of approximateiy 57%, as compared with a steady-state share of roughly 26%. In terms of Iabor in efficiency units the numbers are smaller because the change in total effective hours is Iower than the change in totai unadjusted hours. In this case, the modei impiies that the investment share shouid increase to approximateiy 45%.
Dynamic effects
As discussed in section 2, the popuiation and the workforce of the former East Germany was approximateiy 26 percent of the corresponding West German numbers at the time of the unification. Examining the effects of a one-time shock of this size may Iead to unrealistic and extreme results given out assumption that migrants do not carry productive capitai with them. One way to produce more reasonabie estimates of the adjustment process is to assume t ha t the migration happens gradually rather t han a t "unificationday" thereby allowing for graduai scrapping of the existing capitai. Therefore we consider a migration shock that Ieads to a 20 percent change in the steady-state share of skilled workers (from 50 percent to 40 percent) and the migration is modelled such that 75 per-
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13 cent of the capi tal is scrapped in the first year 4 . For the sake of illustration, we assume p = O. The effects on aggregate per-capita variables are illustrateci in panel A of figure 6 while panel B shows the effects on disaggregateci variables.
The response of aggregate variables is similar, in some respect, to the adjustments brought about by a sudden disruption of the capitai stock. Because the capitai-labor ratio (measured in efficiency units) initially falls, the return on capitai increases. This leads to an increase in the investment share (7 percent in the first year -of its steadystate value of 26 percent) and, in our case, also to an increase in investment per capita 5 .
The decline in output per-capita is smaller than the initial drop in the capital-labor ratio (about 15%) because skilled agents work harder following the inflow of low-skilled agents to increase the (total) capitai stock faster.
Note that the model predicts "undershooting" output dynamics: output per-capita drops by approximately 7 percent in the short run and keeps on decreasing for 3 years before picking up. This phenomena is consistent with the German data presented in figure  2 . The associateci change in aggregate consumption is larger (10 percent on impact), but the turn-around is faster (aggregate consumption picks n p again after 2 years). Clearly, the large relative fall of consumption in the model is the conseqnence of the need to increase investments.
Because the associateci changes in per-capita variables are smaller than the increase in population ( 15 percent in the first year), the m o del also predicts t ha t total investment and total output increase. Qnantitatively, the magnitude of the short run changes is comparable with the ones actually observed in Germany. For example, in the model total output grows by about 8% and investment by about 19% while there is a 14% percent increase in total output and a 25% increase in fixed investments in the data in first year after relmification. The model also predicts, in per-capita terms, a 7% drop in output and an increase in investments of about l percent while in Germany output per-capita declined by 10 percent and investments where roughly unchanged in the first year.
In the short-medium long, the wage per efficiency lmit decreases in the model (because of the drop in the capital-labor ratio) and the interest rate increases. This differential behavior of the marginai product of the two factors of production produces a substantial redistribution of incarne across classes of agents along the adjustment path: in fact low-skilled workers' income and consumption decline. Thus, while lmskilled agents are unaffected in the long-run, they are adversely affected in the short to medium run. Akerlof et. al. (1991) have estimateci that, if 4% of the East German labor force wmùd migrate to the West, wages will be depressed on average by 3.15%. Since 4% of the 14 East German labor force correspond roughly to a l% temporary fiow of migrant. we can calculate the maximum drop caused by this infiow on the unskilled wage of the receiving economy. We fi.nd that, in the model, the initial drop in unskilled wages is approximately 0.5% (recall that wages are unchanged in the long-nm).
Overall, there are two highly intertwined qualitative effect.s following a tmifi.cation with the features we have described. First, there is a redist.ributive effect over the business cyde with holders of capitai benefi.tting and workers (both skilled and unskilled) being worse off as competition from newcomers decreases their wage rate. Second, there is a strong income effect in the long-nm since high skilled workers, which are now a smaller fraction of the population, permanently own more capitai per head. This makes their income and consumption permanently higher and their hours permanently lower since the relative abundance of low-skilled labor, results in substitution of high-skilled labor in production. Therefore, absent a welfare state, unifi.cation would have been unambiguously encouraged by those sectors of the economy which own capi tal and/ or are highly productive.
Unification and the Welfare State
In this section we examine whether the macroeconomic effects we have described change when there is government actively pnrsuing redistributive policies. We consider two different policies:
• an egalitarian rule (ER), where the income tax rate on high-skilled workers is chosen so as to keep the ratio of income of skilled to unskilled agents constant; that is, the government chooses the income tax rate o n skilled agents ( Tt) an d the transfer rate (J-Lt) to satisfy the government budget constraint and
where 1/J is the wedge in the after-tax income of the two types of agents.
• an insurance rule (IR), where the government insures the income (consumption) of low-skilled agents from any type of fiuctuations, i.e., taxes and transfers are chosen to satisfy the government budget constraint and to make:
where rr is a constant.
The first rule is very common both in theoretical studies examining the static effects of migration (see Razin and Sadka (1995) ). Egalitarian rules also turn our to be sufficiently popular as redistributive tools in standard models of public fi.nance (see e.g. Auerbach and Kotlikoff ( 1987) ) t o gran t them a particular status in onr study.
The second rule is of particular interest for two reasons. First, Schrettl (1992) suggests that the distinguishing feature of the East German transition process compared to that
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15 of other formerly centrally planned economies was that West Germany provided exactly this type of insurance 6 . Secondly, the introduction of such a scheme effectively provide credit constrained agents with publicly f1mded insurance (see e.g. Padoa-Schioppa (1987) for the rationale for such a scheme in the context of a European fiscal1mion).
We assume that before 1mification the income tax rate on skilled agents is 5%, a value we believe is reasonable once it is taken into account that the tax rate in our model relates only to the parts of the government budget associateci with redistribution.
Egalitarian Tax Rule
The first type of tax rule we consider is such that the entire ( after-tax) income distribution may move over the cycle as long as its relative structure is unchanged. Here we treat '1/J as a parameter and the benchmark value corresponds to the value implied by a 5% income tax rate on skilled agents. Given other parameters of the model, this implies that the unskilled after-tax income is 38% of the after tax income of the skilled. Table 2 summarizes the long-run effects of migration in this setup. In contrast to the model without a welfare state, the capital-output ratio and the capital-labor ratio change because the tax rate must increase in the long run. This leads to a bigger drop in long-run aggregate activity in per-capita terms 7 . For example, a 10 percent change in the skill composition now leads to a decrease in output per-capita of 4.2% as compared to 3.3% in the baseline model. Notice that skilled consumption now drops in the long-run (it increased in the baseline model) and that low-skilled agents now gain from migration: the capitai owners' income increase so that taxes and redistribution increase.
The impulse responses following a migration disturbance with the same features WL have considered before are in figure 7 . The most important change relative to the baseline case occurs because the marginai tax rate on skilled agents increase as the before-tax high-skilled income increases. This increase in marginai taxes discourages investments producing smaller initial effects on investment, hours in efficiency units and productiL and also leads to a slower adjustment process in the transition to the new steady-state. At the disaggregateci level, the tendencies we have previously outlined are exasperated. Because there are permanent changes in the income distribution in favor of capitai holders, these agents now bear the majority of the adjustment costs associateci with the unification.
Overall, the results suggest that this redistribution scheme has important side effects when unification takes place under the conditions we have described. With an infiow of low-skilled workers, the "size" of the welfare system increases and skilled agents, which are 6 Schrettl (1992) also suggests that the "insurance" was provided by the German state as income transfers to the former East Germany in exchange for the property rights to the capitai stock of the former East German government.
7 Notice also that the effects on hours in efficiency units are identical to those in table l. This is due to the proportional tax rate combined with the assumptions of homothetic preferences and the fixed relative wage between the two types of labor.
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16 a smaller fraction of the population, must contribute a larger percentage of government outlays. Because they are taxed more heavily they lower investments generating a reduction of per-capita income that exceeds that observed in the case without redistribution.
Which sectors of the society benefit from the presence from an egalitarian nùe when mlification takes place tmder wage and exchange rate parity? Skilled agents are definitely worse off since their consumption declines in the long run while tmskilled agents benefit since their consumption increases. Table 3 smnmarizes the long-run effects of unification of this tax scheme. As under the previous tax nùe, unification increases the marginai tax rate and leads to changes in the capital-output and capital-labor ratios and this reinforces the negative long-run effects on aggregate activity. Quantitatively, the effects are slightly smaller than in the previous case: a 10 percent changes in the composition of the poptùation now leads to a 4.1 percent drop in output per capita as compared to 4.2 percent in the previous case and this is due to the fact that unskilled consumption now is unchanged whereas it actually increased in the previous case. Thus, the associateci tax changes are smaller tmder this rule.
Insurance Tax Rule
The impulse responses of the variables following a migration disturbance tmder this nùe are presented in figure 8 . In generai, the responses of macro variables to the disturbance are very similar to those presented in figure 7 . The short run tax effects are slightly larger than under the egalitarian nùe because wages fall in the short run ( thus taxes need to be increased more than in the previous case because skilled income is also adversely affected by the drop in wages). This produces a slightly larger short nm decrease in investments and a smaller increase in skilled hours. The quantitative differences between this scenario and the egalitarian case are however small.
To summarize, the tmification of two countries under the conditions described here leads to a substantial increase of the size of the welfare state. Since skilled workers/capitalists bear the burden of this increase, the long run repercussions may be dramatic both in terms of permanently lower per-capita income level and the time needed to reach the new steady state. Also, the short run recessionary effects will be exasperated leading to a prolonged and deep downturn in the economy.
Lessons for the German Experience
Our exercise has provided us with some indications on how to interpret the recent developments in the German economy after the fall of the Berlin Wall.
Given wage and exchange rate parities, we modelled the tmification of the two sides of Germany as a mass-migration of low skilled agents, holding no capi tal from one cmmtry to another. Absent any government redistribution scheme, this combination of circumstances has effect very similar to that of a sudden disruption of the per-capita capitai stock of the receiving economy. In the short run entrepreneurs will invest more to rebuild the capitai stock (given the high reai interest rate). In the long nm, both capitai and output percapita will be lower even though the capital-output ratio and therefore investment share are constant. In our model there is no tmemployment, but it is clear from the way we have seti t up that if some of the migrants are unemployed, for example, because unskilled wage is above market clearing, our qualitative conclusions will stili hold. Quantitatively, the short run effects on investment, capitai stock and real interest rates will be smaller, because the relative abundance of capitai and labor changes, while in the long run the decline in capitai and output per-capita cmùd be amplified. Our model predicts that a unification without redistribution will have generateci an investment boom, led to a temporary increase in the growth rate of output, to a permanent redistribution of income to the entrepreneur sector and to a long run decline in per-capita income because the capital-labor ratio falls. Hence, in this ideai situation, capi tal owners ( the westeners) would have largely benefitted from the unification and the drop in the world ranking of percapita income experienced by Germany after unification should have expected following the decline in the capital-labor ratio.
Clearly the permanent redistribution in favor of the entrepreneur section would have not been substantiable and may have led to politica! unrest. The choice of the government to engage in generous redistribution schemes in an attempt to shield low-skilled agents from income fiuctuations or to kept them in a dose income range of the high skilled shmùd not come to a surprise. What are the consequences of these actions? We have seen that the redistributive burden on the high-skilled/capital owners may have substantially exasperated the negative effects of the shock leading to permanently lower per-capita income in the long-run. Moreover, the increased tax burden discouraged private investments and produced a net decrease in the contribution of these agents to the welfare state, just at a time when welfare outlays were about to increase. Hence, as the tax burden began to bite, investment and output per-capita declined relative to the no redistribution case, even in short nm.
Two qualifications are important to strengthen these statements. We have assumed that the government finance transfers on a period-by-period basis, while in the actual German economy, transfers are partially financed by borrowing. If the economy is Ricardian or the horizon of repayment of the government debt is short (because of the tight corset of Maastricht nùes), our setup mimics well the expected qualitative effects that would occur even when borrowing is present 8 . Second, we ha ve neglected the possibility that low-skilled migrants may be endowed with some wealth at the time when they reach the receiving country. This feature can be easily added to the model without changing
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18 the qualitative reslùts of the analysis. Because without redistribution, the income of low skilled declines, it is conceivable that migrants will nm down their assets to increase current consumption along the adjustment path. Therefore, the addition of a wealth (saving) endowment to the model will have effect neither on capitai accurrnùation nor on the long nm output level. If migrant wealth (savings) is canalized toward investment, rather than consmnption, both low-skilled and high-skilled consumption will decline less and there may be small or no effect on long nm output. In other words, if East Germans could be convinced to be more patient in their consumption needs, the whole economy cOlùd be better off, both along the adjustment path and in the long run. However, given that consumption desires have been limited for so many years, this possibility will hardly be an option for the future.
In conclusion, the decline in the standards of living of Germany, observed after unification, could have been entirely predicted by the model and attributed to a combination of constrains on investment opportlmities and heavy redistribution which tilted the economy into a "vicious" path.
Are the remedies to this situation? In the next section we offer some suggestions in this regard either based on the reslùts so far obtained or following policies advocated in policy circles and in the popular press.
Policy Corrections
Our model indicates that the economy could be better off in the long run without redistribution, i.e., tightening up the belt now, may have beneficiai consequences in the long run. While this may be an option, it may not be feasible given the current state of affairs. The model also suggests that if the pool of saving existing in the East could be incentivateci and directed to investment purposes, the temporary reduction of the standard of living in the East may be compensateci by a improved conditions in the long run. However, channelling savings toward investment may take time and may not give a sufficiently strong jumpstart to the economy in the short medium run.
As alternatives, we examine two policies suggested by the popular press and policy commentators. First, we consider a reduction of the welfare benefits for migrants, in the sense that the government let their income be unrelated to (and possibly lower than) the income of unskilled locals. We believe such policy cOlùd mimic current lmions actions toward achieving more fiexibility in the labor market in the Eastern landers. It also appears to be duable in the current conditions since wage differential is apparently not one of the major determinants of East German decision to move to the West, and since East Germans are apparently willing to accept it as long as jobs are available (see Akerlof, et. al. (1991) ). In the context of our model we consider a limiting case where the government redistribute only to locals and attempts to keep only the income of locals in 7 POLICY CORRECTIONS 19 a fixed proportion. In this case the budget constraint is (20) where lo is the proportion of skilled agents before the migration and we still assume that (18) holds for local residents. The goods market clearing condition for this case is Yt = /tct+!rcr+!;c~+xt where 1r is share ofunskilled native,~~ is the share ofunskilled migrants an d c~ their consumption ( which equals their wage in come). Figure 9 illustrates the effects of unification for this tax scheme. The dynamics are intermediate between those of the baseline model and the pure egalitarian model. Because redistribution is now only among the native, the tax effects are smaller than those in the pure egalitarian case. Thus, there are smaller disincentives on investment and skilled labor supply: investment per-capita now is roughly unchanged on impact and the skilled labor supply rises by almost as much as in the previous model. The long-run declines in output and investment are therefore smaller than in the egalitarian model but larger than in the baseline model. The main distributional effect of this scheme, relative to the egalitarian tax scheme, is that there is a reallocation from the newcomers to the "native" 1mskilled agents. Hence, t~1e "native" unskilled gain because of the larger pool of tax revenues produced by the increase in skilled agents' income.
Second, we will consider the possibility of taxing the capitai and wage portion of the income of skilled agents differently. We have seen that the German government has made huge infrastructural investments in the East, while this possibility was not allowed for in the model. Nevertheless, we can predict the effect of such an action in the model if we interpret government investment effort as a differential tax rate on capitai vs. laL income, with the first one being fixed in the adjustment process. In this case we assume that the budget constraint for the government is:
where T 8 c are capitai income taxes and T 81 are labor income taxes and the egalitarian rule implemented by the goverment is (22) Table 10 presents the dynamic effects of unification under this scheme. At aggregate level the path of macrovariables is very similar to the one produced in the case of no redistribution. In particular, investments increase a t impact and decline less in the long run relative to the basic redistributive cases and the wage rate converges to the old steady state. In generai, the long run decline in capitai stock and investment is smaller with this rule than with any other schemes. At disaggregateci level, skill consumption stili declines in the long run, there is less redistribution in favor of unskilled ( the gap between their income and their consumption is smaller) relative to the egalitarian scheme but unskilled consumption increases in the long nm.
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Overall this scheme reduces the distortions on investments caused by egaiitarian redistribution and transfer the benefits of the higher capitai income to the unskilled. Hence, lmskilled agents (both local an d newcomers) will be better off relative to both the baseline and the egalitarian case, while skilled agents are not necessarily worse off relative to the egalitarian setup.
Summary and Conclusions
In this paper we have analyzed the macroeconomic consequences of German unification lmder wage and exchange rate parity when there is a welfare state interested in either maintaining an egalitarian distribution of income or from shielding newcomers from the adjustment process. We emphasize that lmification under these conditions resembles a mass migration of low-skilled agents holding no capitai from one country to another.
We find that such an event induces adjustments which, to some extent reproduce those that would take piace if the capitai stock were suddenly disrupted. An infiow of low-skilled workers leads to higher investments over the adjustment path, and, because agents are heterogeneous in their productivity characteristics, it also has a composition effect which leads both to long run changes (a decrease in the per-capita level of capitai, output an d investment) an d to differential impact o n skilled an d unskilled agents.
These effects are altered by the presence of redistribution schemes. When the government attempts to keep the ratio of skilled to unskilled agents after tax income constant, there is a stronger negative effect on the capitai stock in the long nm since the unification forces skilled agents to finance a larger welfare state. In addition, we observe a prolonged period of adjustment with a long cycle of large amplitude and to an overall decline in welfare for both types of agents.
We interpret these results in light of the German experience and conclude that the attempt of the government to shield East Germans from the adjustment costs imposed by the wage and exchange rate policy has, in fact, exasperated the problem and may produce worse long run conditions. We have also discussed two policies attempting to reverse the negative effects of redistribution and saw that both offer relief to the current situation.
The arguments we have presented hold for a closed economy, the present analysis could be relatively easily extended to an open economy framework. Such an extension would be important because the unification was associateci with a considerable deterioration of the German trade balance. However, we doubt that out conclusions concerning output and investment dynamics would change but it is possible that the dynamics of consumption may be altered because "native" agents would be able to ensure their consumption using international financial markets.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that the sitnation we have described may turn ont to be less gloomy than expected since, as we mentioned, the educational level of East German workers is on average higher than that of West Germans. It is therefore possible that a large fraction of migrants may in fact become skilled very quickly, as they adapt to western style of management, increasing the productivity of labor and contrasting the negative long run effects we have described. The fact that in the 1992-94 period output growth in the East has been driven almost entirely by total factor productivity increase may be the first symptom of this switch in the composition of the German labor force.
Appendix A
The steady-state capital-output ratio is determined exdusively by preferences and technology and given by:
The steady-state investment share is :
where s(j) denotes the output share of component j.
Steady state unskilled hours is equal to eu. We assume that eu= es =e. Hours worked for the skilled and the consumption share for the two groups of agents are determined by the following relationships:
When p = O the first of these conditions reduces to:
s(cs)wl
It also follows from the government budget constraint that, for a given
Finally, the level of steady-state output is given by:
(A.8)
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Appendix B In this appendix we show that when T 8 is zero, steady-state output will be increasing in the share of skilled workers. From appendix A steady-state output is given by:
so that the steady-state output level, for given preferences and technology, is determined by the effective labor input per capita since the capital-output ratio exclusively depends on preferences and technology. When taxes are zero, ~teady-state high-skilled homs and consumption shares of the two groups of agents are given by: 
This is a second order equation in effective labor input. It has one zero root and one positive root given by:
It follows immediately from (B.5) that:
which is positive as long as w > l. Hence, steady-state output is also increasing in ì as long as w > l. It also follows that skilled hours also depends positively on ì· Tables   26   Table l ----. 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 
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